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FLORA S. MECHAM, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARTHUR R. ALLEN and 
J. H. ALLEN, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Case No. 7865 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Statement of Facts seems so meager, so 
lacking in some essentials, that Respondents deem it 
advisable to restate the facts in detail. 
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On page 1 of appellants' brief they make the follow-
ing statement: "That the Mechams had left their home 
in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, early on the morning 
of July 4th." There is nothing in the record, and ap-
pellants make no reference in the record to support their 
statement as to whether the Mechams left early or late 
in the morning. The only reference is at page 266 
where Flora Mecham stated, "We went down the canyon 
that morning to see the parade and then came back 
just before noon to have lunch." 
Tom Mecham, the decedent, was driving a Chevrolet 
automobile at the time of his death. Appellant Arthur 
Allen was driving a Ford tractor-trailer unit with an 
over-all length of 45 feet. 
On the 3rd of July, the day before the accident, ap-
pellant Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley left Draper, 
Utah, about 4: 30 p. m. in the afternoon. They drove the 
Ford tractor-trailer to Wendover, Utah. R. 354, 384, 376. 
There they slept about an hour and then loaded cattle 
until about 12:00 o'clock midnight. R 377. They then 
started back, drove all that night, stopped in Pleasant 
Grove for breakfast and arrived at their destination 
where they were to deliver the cattle, about 20 miles 
east of Heber, about 10:00 a.m. that morning. R. 397. 
After unloading the cattle they proceeded down Provo 
Canyon to the place where they ran into the Mecham 
Chevrolet automobile which was traveling up canyon. 
Appellants state at page 3 of their brief, "Other than 
the occupants of the car, no creditable witnesses to the 
accident were produced at the trial." Appellants' state-
ment is untrue. A resume of the testimony of the various 
witnesses is given herewith. 
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Mr. Otis L. Ercanbrack, eyewitness to the accident, 
testified that he was traveling up Provo Canyon on the 
day of the accident and was the third car behind the 
Mecham car when appellants tractor-trailer ran into 
Mecham. R. 236. Witness Ercanbrack testified that the 
Ford tractor-trailer attempted to pass an old Chevrolet 
or Ford (R. 237) but apparently when appellant saw 
that he could not pass without running into the Mecham 
car, he attempted to cut the tractor-trailer back to his 
own side of the road, but could not get back to his own 
side of the highway before he had rammed into the 
Mecham car. R. 238, 239. Ercanbrack further testified 
that at the time of the impact the appellants' tractor-
trailer was on the Mecham's side of the highway. R. 
239, 240. The front of the tractor was about three-
quarters over on the Mecham side of the road; the back 
of the trailer was just about completely on the Mecham 
side of the road. R. 239. 
Mr. Ercanbrack stated he did not get out of his 
truck. R. 240. He was motioned around the Mecham 
car and continued up the highway. Witness Ercanbrack 
stated that when the two cars involved in the accident 
came to rest, that the back of the trailer was resting on 
the front of the Mecham car. R. 258. That the driver of 
the tractor-trailer backed up his unit and "with the help 
of the men that were there, they got hold of the side of 
the truck and sort of slipped Tom's car back to the side." 
R. 249, 250, 260. They then took Tom Mecham out of his 
car and laid him down on the ground. 
Mr. Ercanbrack testified that he was a neighbor of 
W. 0. Mecham; that he had known his son Tom; that 
they had lived in the same town of Wallsburg, Mr. 
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Mecham living at one end, he living at the middle. 
That he did not know it was W. 0. Mecham's son Tom 
that was killed until he heard W. 0. Mecham arrive 
on the scene and make the statement, "Oh, God, its my 
boy." Witness Ercanbrack was shown the various pic-
tures which were introduced as exhibits in this case 
showing the wrecked Mecham automobile and the 
tractor-trailer. He expressly and particularly with refer-
ence to Exhibit D, stated that the automobile and truck 
were not in the position as shown in Exhibit D at the 
time he first saw them. R. 257. At page 258 of the record 
he made the statement, with reference to the position of 
the tractor-trailer and automobile, as shown in Exhibit 
D, "It should be connected up with this trailer here. 
"Q. You say that the trailer here should be 
connected up with the car that appears in the pic-
ture? 
"A. Pretty close to the radiator of this car so you 
could see it* * ." 
Further with reference to Exhibit 1 that was shown 
to him and introduced as an exhibit, Mr. Ercanbrack 
stated it did not represent the correct position of the cars 
after the impact. R. 260. 
Mr. W. 0. Mecham in his testimony estimated that 
he arrived at the scene of the accident approximately 
3 or 4 minutes after the occurrence. That it was probably 
30 minutes before the ambulance arrived at the scene 
of the accident. R. 117, 118. W. 0. Mecham further testi-
fied that after he arrived at the scene of the accident he 
began looking for the little children. That in looking for 
the little girl he discovered two big marks upon the 
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asphalt surface of the road in the Mecham lane of traffic 
up canyon from the Mecham car, indicating dual tire 
marks. R. 127, 128. He estimated they were about 4 feet 
in length and the nearest mark to the center line was 
about 2 feet away. R. 128. 
Mr. Warren Peay testified that at the time of the 
accident he was patrolling the pipe line of the Utah 
Power & Light Company in Provo Canyon. R. 220. That 
he did not see the accident but that he heard it. That 
upon hearing the accident he walked back up the pipe 
and came down the canyon to the scene. Mr. Peay testi-
fied that he arrived on the scene of the accident in about 
20 or 30 minutes. R. 221. That at the time he arrived 
the two vehicles involved in the accident were in the 
following position-the truck was off to the side of the 
road in the lane for down canyon traffic and the touring 
car was turned diagonally across the road on the M~cham 
side of the road for up-canyon traffic. R. 221. Mr. Peay 
further testified that he made an examination of the 
·highway the following day and that he noticed two 
marks on the highway up from where the Mecham car 
was located. R. 223. Mr. Peay testified that these marks 
were approximately 3 to 4 feet long and that they were 
located close together. That one was just about on the 
center line and the other one on the opposite side of 
the center line. They were on the side of the road for 
up-canyon traffic, and they were made from dual tires. 
R. 224. Mr. Peay further testified that they examined 
that spot on the road several times subsequent to this 
day and that these marks were still there on the road 
for a period of two or three days. 
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Mrs. Flora Mecham, one of the plaintiffs in this suit, 
testified that as they were proceeding up the canyon, 
she was looking out to the side of the road and a car had 
just passed them when she turned and saw this big 
truck swaying. That this truck in relation to the high-
way itself appeared to her to be on the side of the road 
for up-canyon travel, their lane of traffic. R. 269, 270. 
That she was rendered unconscious at the time of the 
impact. R. 270. She did know that she regained con-
sciousness for a short time subsequent to the accident 
and that she was out on the side of the road, but that 
she never saw her husband alive subsequent to the 
impact. R. 270. 
Mr. Arthur Allen, one of the defendants in this 
action, was not present in court during the trial, but his 
deposition was read into the record. Said deposition was 
taken upon stipulation of counsel for plaintiffs and de-
fendants. R. 350. Mr. Arthur R. Allen testified that on 
the day of the accident, the 4th of July, there was a lot 
of traffic going down and up the canyon. R. 359. That 
subsequent to the impact his truck came to rest to the 
side of the road by some Cottonwood trees. That it was 
not touching or close by the Chevrolet automobile. He 
stated that the truck could not be moved at the time it 
came to rest. R. 361. That he saw no one attempt to 
move the truck by hand and he did not attempt to move 
it under its own power; that it was only moved when 
the wrecker hooked onto it to take it away. R. 362. He 
further testified that the Chevrolet automobile was ap-
proximately 25 feet from the rear of the semi-trailer at 
the time it came to rest. R. 3'62. That the truck, except 
for the left front wheel was entirely off the highway on 
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the righthand side and that cars could freely pass. That 
the Chevrolet automobile was across the highway, the 
front end protruding about 2 feet across the center line 
and that it was obstructing traffic in this particular. R. 
362, 363. Mr. Allen testified that he first saw the Chev-
rolet automobile when it was about 100 or 150 feet down 
the canyon from him. R. 363. He stated, "Well, I was 
just coming around Bridal Veil Falls. I was still on the 
bend when I saw the car coming through the trees, I was 
just close to it, the car swerved at me and I cut it off 
the road." Mr. Allen later corrected this statement to 
read, "The car sv;erved at me and I cut the truck off 
the road. And I hit my air brakes and left tire marks 
where I left the road, and I went out through the trees 
and off my side of the road." Mr. Allen stated that when 
he first saw the Chevrolet automobile it was on its own 
side of the road; that when it was 35 or 40 feet from him 
that it changed its direction and came head-on into his 
truck. R. 364, 365. Mr. Allen testified that the left front 
corner of his trailer unit hit the Chevrolet; that it was 
not a head-on collision; ·that the Chevrolet automobile 
missed the cab. That he examined the brake marks 
made by the dual wheels of his truck on the surface of 
the road. That he talked to a number of people at the 
accident and he remembered talking to the highway 
patrolman, Dale Mousley and Allen P. Smith of Draper 
He knew of no eye witnesses to the accident. R. 366, 
367. Mr. Allen further testified that there were no cars 
just ahead of him and that if there had been any he 
would have seen them. R. 368. 
Mr. Dale Mousley, who was riding in the truck with 
Mr. Allen, testified that he was not driving at the time 
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of the accident. That they were proceeding down Provo 
Canyon and he wasn't paying attention to the road. 
That he was a little tired as he had been up all night 
the night before. That the first thing that disturbed him 
was a statement from Arthur Allen when he hollered, 
"Look out." Up to that time he hadn't been paying too 
much attention and that all he saw was the top of the 
Mecham car pass the truck. R. 387, 388. After striking 
the Mecham car he felt the truck go over to the right-
hand side of the road. R. 388. Mr. Mousley stated that 
when the truck stopped it was clear off the highway onto 
the dirt and the Mecham car was 30 or 40 feet up-canyon 
and 2 feet across the middle line of the highway. R. 
389, 390. Mr. Dale Mousley further testified that no cars 
appeared on the scene of the accident for 2 or 3 minutes 
and that there were no cars at the site at the time of 
the accident. R. 391, 392. 
Mr. Neldon Evans, an officer of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, investigated the accident. R. 319. Mr. Evans 
testified that he received a call about 11:40 or 11:30. That 
he was going north from Provo on Highway 189 and 
that it took him approximately 10 to 15 minutes to drive 
to the scene from the time he got the call. R. 320. Of-
ficer Clark, another officer of the highway patrol, fol-
lowed Officer Evans to the scene of the accident. That 
at the time Officer Evans and Officer Clark arrived at 
the scene of the accident the injured people were in the 
ambulance, so they helped the ambulance turn around 
and start down the canyon. They then ·began their in-
vestigation, i.e., to take measurements and inquire around 
for any witnesses. R. 321. Mr. Evans testified that at the 
time he arrived at the scene of the accident that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
tractor-trailer,-"lt was sitting on the north side of the 
highway, pretty well off the highway, under some trees 
facing down the canyon facing west." R. 322. The Chev-
rolet automobile was on the south part of the highway 
with the front end extending about to the middle of the 
line "and 72 feet up-canyon from the tractor-trailer .. , 
R. 322, Exhibit 8. Mr. Evans testified that he saw tire 
burns or marks upon the highway. R. 323. That these 
tire burns started about 4 ft. north of the center line 
in the lane for automobiles moving down canyon, and 
extended to a point at the rear of the truck that was 
off to the north side of the road. R. 323. That there were 
gouges in the oiled surface and the gouges extended 
to the point where the automobile came to rest. R. 323. 
On the diagram, Exhibit 8, Officer Evans placed a 
rectangle and in that rectangle the letter "M" to rep-
resent the Mcham car as it was situated on the high-
way at the time he arrived at the scene. Officer Evans 
also placed a rectangle on the diagram Exhibit 8, and 
placed the initial "T" in said rectangle to represent the 
tractor-trailer. R. 328, 329. Officer Evans also placed 
upon the diagram lines to represent the tire burns and 
gouges on the road. He placed an initial "B" by the tire 
burns and an initial "G" by the gouges. R. 330. Officer 
Evans testified that most of the damage was to the rear 
wheels of the tractor, the front of the trailer and the rear 
wheels of the trailer, although there was a little mark 
on the tractor just over the front tire. But it wasn't 
very deep. R. 331, 333. Officer Evans testified that he 
remained at the scene of the accident about an hour 
and 15 or 20 minutes and that the trailer and tractor 
were moved by a wrecker during that time. R. 332. 
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Officer Evans testified that the tractor and trailer were 
incapable of being moved at the time he examined them 
except by means of a wrecker. R. 353. 
Officer Evans testified that they looked for other 
marks besides the ones he drew on the diagram and they 
found no other marks. That they asked the bystanders 
if they had seen the accident and they found no witnes-
ses to the accident. R. 336. Officer Lawrence J. Clark 
of the Utah Highway Patrol also testified at the trial. 
His testimony with reference to the position of the 
vehicles and the marks upon the highway was sub-
stantially the same as that testified to by Officer Neldon 
Evans. R. 239. 
The plaintiffs called William White of Provo, Utah, 
as a witness. Mr. White had previously been listed as 
an eye witness by the plaintiffs in response to inter-
rogatories submitted by defendants. R. 169, R. 19. Mr. 
White, in company with his brother and their wives, 
was traveling up Provo Canyon at the time of the ac-
cident. R. 169, 170. Mr. White upon being examined 
by plaintiffs' counsel suddenly could not remember any-
thing regarding the accident, or that he was an eye 
witness to the accident or that he had previously stated 
to either Mr. Boyce or Mr. Leland McCullough prior to 
the trial that he was an eye witness to the accident. R. 
173-177. Mr. White when asked, "Did you tell me and 
Mr. McCullough on that occasion that you had witnessed 
this accident?" A. "I don't remember of it sir, I may 
have done it." R. 179. 
The court at page 192 of the record questioned Mr. 
White as follows: 
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THE COURT: Mr. White, have some of the answers 
you gave to Mr. Boyce on his first examination of you 
been different than what you told him on these three 
occasions when he says that he talked to you at your 
home? 
A. Well, I really don't know, sir. 
THE COURT: Well if there are any what, if any, 
is your explanation of any inconsistencies in your testi-
mony between today, if it occurred, and statements you 
are supposed to have made to Mr. Boyce on any of these 
three occasions? 
A. Well, I don't really know just what I really have 
told him, sir, and-I don't really .know what to say 
about it." R. 193. 
Dr. Glen Allen of Provo testified as to the injuries 
suffered by Flora Mecham. He stated as follows, 
"The wound was an avulsed type of laceration, 
more or less 'Y' shaped, extending from the nose, 
the bridge of the nose I should say back over to the 
scalp; forked in two directions, to the right and to 
the left, almost completely avulsing the scalp from 
the skull." 
R. 199. She suffered also a compound fracture of the 
nose, traumatic injuries and shock. R. 200. There was 
also a mild concussion. R. 200. At the time he examined 
Flora Mecham the scalp was torn off exposing the bony 
area of the skull and bleeding profusely. R. 201. Dr. 
Allen's last examination of Mrs. Mecham on Nov. 30, 
1950, showed that the wound had healed but there was 
a scar which is evident and some skin or cutaneous, what 
is called anesthesia localized to the area of the scar. 
R. 201, 202. 
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Dr. Allen also examined Leonard Mecham sub-
sequent to the accident. He had a rather jagged lacera-
tion of the left eyebrow and of the left forehead region. 
R. 203. That he suffered a mild brain concussion. R. 
203. 
Linda Mecham was directed to the hospital. She 
suffered abrasions and wounds of the face but her in-
juries were rather minor. R. 204. 
Dr. Allen testified that he examined Gary Mecham, 
the baby; that the left ear was almost completely 
avulsed from the skull, or the scalp, and he also showed 
some signs of inter-cranial damage. Approximately five 
hours after his admission to the hospital he developed 
some neurological signs consisting of rigidity, spasms, 
and he was immediately taken to a neuro-surgeon in 
Salt Lake City. R. 204. 
Dr. Stewart Wright, a neuro-surgeon in Salt Lake 
City, testified to the injuries of Gary Mecham as fol-
lows: (R. 207) 
"Well, when I first saw Gary he was un-
conscious. The history, as we have mentioned, was 
that he had been in a car which had been involved 
in an accident and he had been unconscious from 
the moment of the accident. He had many signs of 
severe brain damage, including the unconsciousness, 
which I mentioned. The left eye turned inward 
and both eyes turned to the right more than average. 
The neck was stiff, the left pupil, the pupil of the 
left eye, was larger than the right one. The right, 
lower extremity, the right leg, was completely 
paralyzed and the right upper extremity was almost 
completely paralyzed. The left leg was somewhat 
rigid or stiff. There was a Babinski sign, we call it, 
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on the left side, which indicated damage to the right 
side of the brain or spinal cord. There was consider-
able swelling of the left side of the head and face; 
there was a laceration above the left ear of the scalp 
which had involved the ear and which had been 
sutured and cared for by Dr. Allen, as I think he 
described earlier. There was a compound fracture of 
the left lower jaw. The temperature was high; the 
pulse and the breathing was very fast, and the blood 
pressure was higher than you normally find in a 
child of that age. He was about eighteen months, as 
I recall, when I first saw him. Those are essentially 
the things which were noted when I first saw him." 
R. 267, 268. 
The first care given to Gary was primarily care 
in sustaining his life as he was desperately ill. R. 268. 
Dr. Wright further testified that in his opinion the child, 
Gary Mecham, suffers a permanent disability as a result 
of this accident. R. 214. That in Dr. Wright's opinion 
he would never have the normal use of the hand, or the 
arm, or the foot or leg on the right side, for all practical 
purposes. R. 214. 
Mr. Leo Hales of Provo, the service manager of 
Naylor Auto Company, received a call on the day of the 
accident to bring a wrecker up Provo Canyon. That 
when he got up the canyon he noted a Chevrolet across 
the road. R. 401. The tractor and trailer were on the 
left hand side of the road coming down the canyon and 
off the oiled road. He arrived at the scene of the accident 
at the time the Utah County Sheriff's office was taking 
pictures. The State Highway Patrol was there at the 
time he arrived. R. 401. Mr. Hales testified that the 
Highway Patrolmen asked him if he could move the 
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truck; that he hooked onto the truck but that he could 
not move it. R. 401. That he picked up the front 
end of the truck and set it off the oil of the road. R. 401. 
Mr. Lester Beck, also an employee of the Naylor 
Auto Company, was called by Mr. Hales to assist him 
in moving the truck, trailer and the automobile. His 
testimony with reference to the position of the tractor-
trailer and Chevrolet automobile is substantially the 
same as that of Mr. Hales. R. 415. 
Officer Myron Gale of the Highway Patrol testified 
for the defendants and ·stated that he visited the scene 
of the accident sometime between the 5th and lOth of 
July subsequent to the accident. R. 417, 418, 419. He 
testified with reference to marks that there was a scuff 
or gouge mark on the north side of the highway about 
2 feet from the center line and coming into, towards the 
center line. That these marks were in the lane for down-
canyon traffic. He further testified that he did not recall 
any other marks on the highway. R. 419, 420. 
Counsel for plaintiffs called Mr. Alfred Carter to 
testify on rebuttal, permission for which was granted 
by the court and no objection was taken to his testimony. 
R. 423. Mr. Carter testified that on the 4th of July, 1950, 
the day of the accident, he was fishing the Provo River 
on the opposite side of the river from where this accident 
took place. R. 423. Upon the diagram, Exhibit 8, Mr. 
Carter drew t~o rectangles to indicate the position of 
the Mecham automobile and the tractor-trailer unit 
driven by Defendant Allen. Mr. Carter made an "R" 
to indicate a rock in the river from which he was fishing 
and from this rock he could look over and see the vehicles 
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involved in the collision. R. 424. Counsel for defendant, 
on voir dire examination, asked Mr. Carter when he had 
first talked to counsel for plaintiffs and Carter stated, 
"Saturday" which was the Saturday during the recess 
of the trial. R. 425, 426. That was the first time Mr. 
Carter had ever talked to any of the counsel for plain-
tiffs. Mr. Carter drew two rectangles on Exhibit 8 
labeling the tractor and trailer "T -1" and the passenger 
car "M-1." The Chevrolet automobile at the time Mr. 
Carter saw it was partially under the back end <;>f the 
trailer. R. 427. The trailer was stopped at this point. At 
the time Mr. Carter saw the vehicles from where he 
was standing on the rock by the river they were in the 
same position that he drew on the map, Exhibit 8. R. 
428. The front end of the passenger car was just about 
a foot maybe 18 inches under the trailer by the back 
wheels. R. 428. The back end of the trailer with refer-
ence to the center line of the highway was over the center 
line of the highway. R. 428, 429. The back end of the 
trailer being in the lane for up-canyon traffic. R. 429. 
Mr. Carter further testified that he left the scene of the 
accident, that he came back up the canyon in a passenger 
car about a half-hour later. That the tractor and trailer 
had been moved to the side of the road and down the 
canyon 35 or 40 feet from where the accident occurred. 
R. 430. The passenger car was moved off on the opposite 
side of the street from the tractor-trailer, and the front 
end of the Chevrolet car was on the hard surfaced por-
tion of the highway. R. 430. On cross examination Mr. 
Carter testified that at the time of the accident he was 
living in Provo; that he was an iron worker for the Utah 
Construction at Geneva Steel; and at that time his im-
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mediate foreman was Jack Stapler. R. 431. That he 
had started on this job July 6, 1938. R. 432. Mr. Carter 
testified that when he drove back up the canyon about 
a half hour after the accident he rode in his brother-
in-law's car, Max Peterson, who lived at Orem, Utah. 
R. 432. Mr. Carter testified that he remembered work-
ing at Geneva Steel with Rollo Blackhurst and Bud Haw-
kins at the time the accident occurred. These men were 
members of the gang with which he was working. R. 
432. Mr. Carter testified that from where he was stand-
ing on the bank of the river fishing that the foliage 
thinned out across the river and up to the road so that 
it was possible to see the road without any obstructions. 
R. 434, 435. Mr. Carter testified that he was at the scene 
of the accident the first time approximately 4 or 5 
minutes, and that the police were not there at the time 
he saw the accident the first time. R. 439. In examining 
Exhibit 4, .Mr. Carter testified that the Chevrolet auto-
mobile was approximately in that position when he saw 
it the first time. R. 440. That with reference to the 
tractor and trailer in Exhibit 1, that the tractor and 
trailer were in the position shown in the exhibit when 
he saw it the second time. That he did not see the 
tractor-trailer moved while he was there. Mr. Carter 
stated that at the time he examined the wreck the first 
time the bed of the trailer was resting on the rear dual 
wheels. R. 446. Mr. Carter was asked with reference 
to the wheels on the tractor, whether or not they were 
in line with the other wheels; he answered, "No, they 
were bent outward." R. 448. Mr. Carter testified that he 
saw no one at the scene of the accident whom he recog-
nized. R. 450. That he did not talk to anyone around 
the accident at that time. R.. 450. 
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At the close of the presentation of the evidence, Mr. 
Billings, one of the counsel for the defendants, stated: 
"Well, now, Your Honor, at this time on behalf 
of the defendants, J. H. Allen and Arthur R. Allen, 
I move for a directed verdict upon the grounds that 
the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the accident was caused by the 
negligence of the defendant, Arthur Allen, in driving 
his truck on the highway in Provo Canyon on July 
4, 1950, and the evidence, the physical evidence un-
disputedly shows that the accident happened on the 
defendant Allen's side of the highway and that the 
only evidence in conflict therewith is the oral testi-
mony of Mr. Ercanbrack and perhaps this fisherman 
and under the well established rule of this jurisdic-
tion where the uncontroverted physical evidence 
establishes the facts the oral testimony conflicting 
therewith must be disregarded and is not substantial 
evidence. 
"The court: You don't mean by that they failed 
to prove a prima facie case, do you? 
"Mr. Billings: Yes. 
"The Court: Your motion will be denied." R. 
452. 
Defendants at page 4 of their statement of fact, 
state in the second paragraph that, "the occupants of the 
truck were not seriously injured but the force of the 
impact twisted the rear wheels of the truck, broke its 
rear springs and the drive shaft and bent the frame of 
the trailer and sheared the springs off its left rear, lock-
ing tts wheels." Further they state in said paragraph, 
"Immediately after the collision the Mecham car was 
facing diagonally across the road, its front end project-
ing into the lane for down canyon traffic with consider-
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able debris in front of it in the down canyon lane (Ex-
hibits "I" and "D''). The truck and trailer were off the 
highway below the car with only the left front wheel 
on the hard surfaced portion." 
Defendants quote no citation from the record to 
support their statements and have entirely ignored the 
testimony presented that the tractor and trailer and the 
automobile at the time they came to rest were hooked 
together, the back end of the trailer sitting upon the front 
end of the automobile and in the lane for up-canyon 
traffic, and that subsequently the Chevrolet automobile 
and the tractor and trailer were moved. Testimony to 
this effect was given by both Mr. Carter and Mr. Ercan-
brack, and that the automobile and tractor and trailer 
were moved prior to the arrival of the investigating 
officers at the scene of the accident. Defendants ignore 
this phase of the testimony and their statement as to 
what was broken or damaged by force of the impact 
should be tempered by the knowledge that the removal 
of the truck and trailer could have caused additional 
damage and as to what that damage consisted of, there 
is no evidence in the record. Defendants state at page 
5 of their brief, in their statement of facts, "Carter also 
testified the truck was moved after the accident, although 
the undisputed physical evidence was that it could not 
be moved without the use of a wrecker." Again defend-
ants have failed to support their statement by any refer-
ence to the record. Of course, such a statement is untrue 
since the testimony of both Carter and Ercanbrack was 
that the truck must have been moved after the accident. 
Both Carter and Ercanbrack testified that the pictures 
shown to them showing the automobile separated from 
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the tractor-trailer and the tractor-trailer down canyon, 
did not represent the scene at the time they saw the 
wreck immediately after the impact. (See supra, testi-
mony of Ercanbrack and Carter). 
Defendants, at page 5 of their statement of facts, 
state: "On rebuttal, plaintiffs produced one Alfred 
M. Carter, who plaintiff claimed was not discovered 
until the weekend recess of the trial in January, 
1952, although he had worked all during the period 
in the same small group with plaintiff's father as a 
fellow employee of Utah Construction Company at 
the Geneva Steel Plant." 
There is no evidence in the record to show what size 
group Mr. Carter may have been working with or in what 
size group plaintiff's father was working at the time he 
and Mr. Carter were working for Utah Construction 
Company, Geneva Steel Plant, or that they were work-
ing together all during this period. R. 81. The affadavit 
of B. F. Romano reads as follows: 
"B. F. Romano, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: That he is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and over the age of twenty-one years; 
that he was employed by the Defendants in the above 
entitled action to investigate one Alfred M. Carter 
of Orem, Utah and the testimony of said Carter 
in the trial of the above entitled matter; that as a part 
of his investigation he interviewed fellow employees 
of Carter at the Utah Construction Company at the 
Geneva Steel Plant; that one of said fellow em-
ployees of said Carter is the fA-ther of the plaintiE 
above named, one Mr. Simmons, and that some 
of the fellow employees of said Carter knew, or 
had heard, that Plaintiff Flora Mecham, the daugh-
ter of said Simmons, was involved in a lawsuit 
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arising out of the death of her husband in an auto-
mobile accident in Provo Canyon. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS AL-
LEN. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE 
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL 
MECHAM. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEN. 
Appellants assign as error No. 1 the failure of the 
trial court to direct a verdict in their favor. The two 
propositions, A and B, which they set forth will be 
treated as one by respondents. Appellants apparent con-
tension is that the uncontroverted physical evidence 
in the. case demonstrates that appellants were not negli-
gent and that Tom Mecham was negligent as a matter 
of law. Appellants state in their brief, page 7, "**Oral 
testimony to the contrary must yield to the undisputable 
physical facts * * ," and cite the Utah case of Haarstrich 
v. O.S.L., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100, to support their state-
ment. Respondents have no quarrel with the rule of 
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law as set forth in the Haarstrich case. This court stated 
in that case, page 104 P. 2d: 
"It only need be stated here that the testimony 
of Mr. Howard in that respect flies in the face of 
uncontroverted physical facts and therefore is not 
substantial evidence." 
It would be but a waste of time to here repeat the testi-
mony of the various witnesses which respondents set 
forth in their statement of fact. The only conclusion 
that can be arrived at after reading the testimony and 
evidence is that there are few, if any, uncontroverted 
facts in this case. The entire theory of respondents' case 
is that when the tractor-trailer and Chevrolet auto-
mobile came to rest, the Chevrolet automobile was under 
the trailer up against t~e back wheels, and on the 
Mecham side of the highway. That subsequent to that 
the tractor-trailer was moved down canyon from the 
Chevrolet automobile and off to the side of the road be-
fore the investigating officers arrived at the scene. By 
the officers own testimony it was 10-15 minutes after 
they received the call before they arrived at the scene 
of the accident. R. 320. When the officers did arrive 
the injured people were already loaded in the ambulance. 
R. 321. Appellants state at page 18 of their brief: 
"The testimony of the investigating officers of 
the Utah Highway Patrol, Evans and Clark, as to 
the physical facts they found, testimony not even 
attempted to be attacked by cross examination or 
otherwise leads but to one conclusion: The Mecham 
car was on the wrong side of the road when the 
collision occurred. Under such circumstances that 
is negligence as a matter of law." 
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However, with reference to physical evidence, appellants 
make no mention of the testimony of Warren Peay, a 
flume walker of Utah Power & Light Co. who testified 
that he saw and examined tire burns upon the surface of 
the road up canyon from the Mecham Chevrolet auto-
mobile. That these marks were in the Mecham lane of 
traffic and were made by dual tires. Further, Mr. Peay's 
testimony was corroborated by the statements of W. 0. 
Mecham, who testified to the same dual tire marks in the 
Mecham lane of traffic. R. 127, 128, 223, Exhibit 7. 
Appellants state at page 7 of their brief, "No one at 
the trial was an actual eye witness able to describe how 
the accident happened." Apparently appellants did not 
even bother to read the record. The testimony of Mr. 
Ercanbrack shows he was an eye witness. R. 236, 237. 
Flora Mecham testified that she saw the tractor-trailer 
immediately prior to the impact. R. 269, 270 .. Arthur 
Allen, one of the appellants, testified as an eye witness to 
the wreck. R. 363, 364, 365. The statements of Mr. 
Ercanbrack and Apellant Arthur Allen are in direct 
conflict as to how the accident happened, and the testi-
mony of all three of these eye witnesses was presented 
to the jury. 
Appellants spend a good portion of their brief at-
tempting to discredit the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack. 
At page 14 of their brief appellants state that Mr. Ercan-
brack testified he could stop his car in one foot when 
going 35 m.p.h. Of course such is not true and Mr. 
Ercanbrack made the statement only to give the impres-
sion that he could stop very quickly-his full testimony 
so indicates,-R. 245: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
"Q. Under what distance can you stop your 
car going at thirty five miles an hour? 
''A. I could stop it then in one foot. 
"Q. Have you ever tried that? 
"A. Yes, sir. Lots of times. 
"Q. You say when you are driving an auto-
mobile at thirty five miles an hour you can stop 
in one foot? 
"A. I can lock all four wheels. I've done it lots 
of times when fellows was about to run into them. 
"Q. And you say when you were going about 
thirty five miles an hour you can stop in one foot? 
"A. I've done it when the roads was dry. At 
least, I think it was about a foot." 
At page 14 of appellants brief they state Mr. Ercan-
brack testified that the Mecham car and the Allen truck 
stopped r1ght at the point where they came together. 
The record is as follows: (R. 250) 
"Q. I asked you, Mr. Ercanbrack, if the two-
vehicles moved any distance on the highway, any 
distance down -canyon after they came together, or 
up-canyon, or what did they do? 
"A. Well, they hit so quick I don't think they 
moved very far. 
"Q. How far do you think they moved? 
"A. I think both of them had to stop. 
"Q. Well, did they or didn't they? 
"A. They had stopped. 
"Q. They stopped right at the point where they 
came together? 
"A. Well, as near as I can tell they did. 
"Q. And you saw them, is that right? 
"A. I sat right there in the car and seen it. 
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"Q. You say some men lifted up the side of the 
trailer so they could pull the car out? 
"A. They helped to." 
Appellants conclude that Mr. Ercanbrack's testi-
mony is not credible because--"Under such conditions, 
the vehicles would not stop as they came together. 
Either the truck would drag the car or the car would be 
thrust back from a point of impact by the additional 
weight of the truck." (Appellants' brief, page 15). Ap-
pellants fail to consider the factor of braking power on 
the tractor-trailer and the effect that would have with 
reference to the forward motion of the tractor-trailer 
being of greater or lesser intensity than the forward 
motion of the Chevrolet automobile. The dual tire burns 
on the highway establish that the driver of the truck 
applied his brakes. With what force the two vehicles 
came together is a question not answered in the record, 
except by the verdict of the jury in which they held 
appellants to be negligent in the operation of the tractor-
trailer and Tom Mecham free from any negligence 
in the operation of his Chevrolet automobile. 
Appellants question Mr. Ercanbrack's ability to see 
the accident and quote Mr. Ercanbrack as saying the 
tractor-trailer was 75 feet up the road when he saw it. 
(Appellant's brief, page 12-15). Mr. Ercanbrack did 
not get out and measure the distances, so he could tell 
just how far he was from the tractor-trailer. As any 
reasonable person knows, such testimony is only an esti-
mation. The driver of the truck, Appellant Arthur Allen, 
stated he saw the Mecham car when it was about 100-
150 feet down the canyon. R. 363. If such is a correct 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
estimation, then Mr. Ercanbrack must have been some-
what farther down canyon when the tractor-trailer first 
came into view. One thing is certain, if the driver of 
the truck could see the Mecham car 100-150 feet down 
the straightaway of the canyon, and how much further 
he could see is not known, then certainly drivers com-
ing in the opposite direction could see the Allen tractor-
trailer at least 100-150 feet up-canyon. Whatever the 
distances were, it is apparent that both Appellant Arthur 
Allen, driver of the tractor-trailer, and Mr. Ercanbrack 
could see the happening of the events that took place. 
Appellants state at page 14 of their brief that Ercan-
brack testified that the men at the scene of the accident 
lifted up the tractor and trailer weighing 8% tons and 
pulled the Mecham car back from under it. Of course, 
Mr. Ercanbrack made no such statement and appellants' 
citations to the record do not support their statement. 
Mr. Ercanbrack's statement in this regard is as follows: 
(R. 250, 251) 
"Q. You say some men lifted up the side of 
the trailer so they could pull the car out? 
"A. They helped to. 
"Q. How many men did that? 
"A. Well, I didn't count them, but they was just 
as thick as they could get around that car." 
Appellants apparently intend that the court gain 
the impression that a group of men lifted the tractor and 
trailer weighing 17,140 lbs. completely off the ground. 
The statement of Mr. Ercanbrack is entirely clear and 
logical, whereas appellants attempt at construction is 
false and deceitful. 
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At page 17 of their brief appellants attempt to dis-
pute the testimony of W. 0. Mecham when he stated 
th~t he saw dual tire burns on the highway up-canyon 
from the Chevrolet automobile. Appellants attempt to 
make much of the fact that W. 0. Mecham did not 
describe these marks when his deposition was taken 
prior to the trial. However, Mr. Mecham explained the 
discrepancies as follows: (R. 141, 142) 
"Q. Now I will ask you * * * if you didn't tell 
Mr. Billings that you did not observe any brake 
marks or tire marks of any kind at the time you 
were there? * * *" 
"A. That was below the car that I had reference 
to. On this side of the car. 
• * • 
"Q. Will you follow me, sir, and do you see your 
answer there when you said 'no' * * * ." 
"A. If I understood the question it was on this 
side of the car that I had reference to." 
Of course appellants fail to mention that Mr. Peay, 
corroborating the testimony of Mr. Mecham, testified to 
these same dual tire marks. R. 223, 224. 
Appellants at page 15 of their brief state, "Nor could 
a truck with its driveshaft broken back up under its own 
power. (See Exhibit 5 and 6) ." Appellants attempted 
to convince the jury that when the tractor-trailer came 
to rest it was in such a condition that it could not be 
moved by its own power, but only by means of a 
wrecker, and therefore the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack 
that the tractor-trailer backed up and was moved prior 
to the arrival of the police officers is not true. There is 
nothing in the record to show whether the driveshaft 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
broke as a result of the impact or as a result of the driver 
attempting to move the truck under its own power. The 
evidence was presented to the jury whether to believe 
plaintiff's presentation of the case or the defendants, and 
they chose to believe the plaintiffs. Plaintiff does not 
dispute the testimony of Mr. Hales as to the mechanical 
condition of the tractor-trailer when he saw it. The 
difficulty is that Mr. Hales cannot tell us when or how 
the driveshaft broke. Appellants' logic is based only on 
facts they want to believe and not the factual evidence 
presented at the trial. 
This is not a case for the application of the rule set 
forth in the Haarstrich case, but rather the rule laid down 
in SEYBOLD V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., No. 
7641,--Utah--, 239 P. 2d 174, 177, wherein the court 
stated: 
"If there is any substantial competent evidence 
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could make the finding, it should stand." 
Or, as was stated in HORSLEY V. ROBINSON, 186 
p. 2d 592, 595: 
"The question of what were the facts and where 
is the preponderance of the evidence is for the jury 
and not for the court to determine. Our problem is 
only to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to sustain the verdict. In doing so our standard is: 
Could a reasonable mind be convinced by the evi-
dence of the necessary facts to support the verdict? 
If so, it must be sustained." 
Based upon the record there is substantial evidence 
upon which the jury found for plaintiffs and, therefore, 
the verdict should be affirmed. 
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II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE 
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL MECHAM. 
In support of appellants' second assignment of error 
appellants' cite as error Instruction No. 11. In the first 
place appellants did not make a proper objection to 
Instruction No. 11 at the time the instruction was pre-
sented to them by the court. Appellants objection is as 
follows: (R. 473) 
"Defendants except to the court's Instruction No. 
11 wherein the jury are told that they may consider 
in connection with all the facts and circumstances 
a presumption that the deceased was exercising due 
and proper care for the protection of his person and 
the preservation of his life, upon the grounds that 
under the evidence introduced in the case all of the 
evidence showed that the impact between the two 
vehicles occurred on the defendants side of said high-
way, in their lane of traffic, and that in the light of 
the undisputed physical evidence, said presump-
tion disappeared and the jury should not have been 
told that they could consider said presumption in 
their deliberations." 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure speci-
fically requires that the ground of the objection be stated 
distinctly. Said rule reads in part, 
"* * * No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless 
he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of 
an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection.* * *" 
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The rule provides that the Supreme Court may in its 
discretion review alleged error of the trial court in the 
giving or failing to give an instruction even though no 
objection is made. However, exceptional circumstances 
must be shown to provide the court with this authority. 
The Appellants in this case have shown nothing by way 
of exceptional circumstances for the "requirements of 
justice" which would allow this court to now consider 
an instruction to which no proper objection was made. 
It is quite obvious that the appellants set forth an entirely 
different legal concept in their brief than the one they 
made to the trial court regarding instruction No. 11. At 
page 25 of their brief appellants state the instruction is 
erroneous,-"In the first place, because it does not cor-
rectly state the law of the State of Utah with respect to 
the presumption of due care on the part of the deceased." 
Particular reference is made by appellants to that part 
of Instruction No. 11,-"You are instructed that, until 
the contrary is proven, there is a presumption* * *."This 
court had upheld such words in this type of instruction. 
See DAVIS V. DENVER & RIO GRANDE W. RY Co., 
45 Utah 1, 9, 142 P. 705: 
"It is a presumption of law that every man 
exercises due care for his own safety when in a place 
of danger, and the presumption is that the deceased 
did so at the time and place when and where it is 
claimed he met his death. The court further instructs 
you that the plaintiff need not affirmatively prove 
that the deceased looked and listened for the train. 
The presumption is that he did so, and the burden 
of proof that he did not is upon the defendant 
railroad company, and it must be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." 
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But, whatever may be the conclusion of the court regard-
ing the use of particular words, it is Respondents' con-
tention that the giving of such instruction was not pre-
judicial error for the reasons hereafter stated. 
Secondly, on page 27 of Appellants' brief they state 
that the giving of any instruction with respect to the 
presumption was prejudicial error. Respondents contend 
that the giving of such an instruction with respect to 
presumption of due care was not prejudicial error. As-
suming that the instruction may be erroneous, it is 
shown conclusively by the other instructions in the case 
and by recent decisions of this court that such an 
instruction is not prejudicial. Said instruction was, in 
effect, nullified by the giving of the following instruc-
tion, portions of which are quoted here. Instruction No. 
2 (R. 455, 456): 
"You are instructed that the burden of proof 
is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the material allegations of her com-
plaint before she is entitled to recover thereon, and 
you are instructed that this burden of proof is like-
wise upon her respecting each and every count con-
tained in her complaint before she is entitled to 
rcover on any one of said counts." 
Instruction No. 2, R. 457-458: 
"You are instructed that the burden of proof 
is upon the defendants to prove their first affirmative 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence; namely, 
that Thomas Udell Mecham was himself guilty of 
contributory negligence as that defense relates to 
claim of Flora Mecham as his widow and in her 
representative capacity on behalf of the surviving 
minor children, and in connection with this matter 
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you are instructed that such a defense, if proven, as 
aforesaid, is a bar to the recovery by Flora Mecham, 
as his widow and as the representative of said minor 
children, for the death of Thomas Udell Mecham; 
and in the event that the defendants have sustained 
that burden of proof then in this respect it would 
be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants and against the plaintiff, Flora S. Mecham, 
guardian ad litem. 
"You are likewise instructed that the burden of 
proof is upon the defendants to prove their second 
affirmative defense before they are entitled to the 
benefit of such defense; namely, that the negligence 
of Thomas Udell Mecham was the sole, proximate 
cause of the collision and his resulting death, and 
in this connection you are instructed that said de-
fense, if proven, is a complete bar to a recovery by 
FloraS. Mecham as his widow and as the representa-
tive of these minor children for any loss or damage 
they sustained by reason of the death of Thomas 
Udell Mecham. 
"You are further instructed that the defense 
of contributory negligence alleged by said defendants 
respecting the conduct of the deceased, Thomas 
Udell Mecham, is not a bar, even though proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence, to a recovery by 
Flora Mecham and said minor children for their own 
personal injuries and damage, provided, however, 
that they in each instance of damage claimed by 
them have sustained the burden of proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence respecting their separate 
counts as heretofore mentioned. 
"Respecting the last part of the preceding in-
instruction and by way of explanation thereof, you 
are instructed that a passenger, such as the widow 
and children herein mentioned, are not chargeable 
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in their. right to recover by the contributory negli-
gence, if any, upon the part of their driver of the 
automobile in which they are riding, even though if 
he is contributorily negligent it proximately caused 
or contributed to the accident, unless, however, his 
contributory negligence was the sole, proximate 
cause of their injury and resulting damage, which 
event would defeat all causes of action by these 
plaintiffs." 
Instruction No. 3, R. 458: 
"Contributory negligence means that a person 
injured has proximately contributed to such injury 
by his want of ordinary care, so that except for 
such want of ordinary care on his part the injury 
would not have resulted. 
"Negligence means the failure to do what a 
reasonably prudent person would have done under 
the circumstances of the situation, or doing what 
such person under existing circumstances would 
not have done. The essence of the fault may lie 
in acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated and 
measured by the exigencies of the occasion." 
Instruction No. 4, R. 459: 
"You are instructed that the law did not require 
defendants driver, ·Arthur Allen, to anticipate or 
guard against anything which could not reasonably 
be expected and did not ·require him to regulate 
his conduct with reference to any conduct on the 
part of Thomas Udell Mecham not reasonably to 
be expected, nor did the law require defendants 
driver to be extraordinarily alert or to foresee all 
that can be seen by looking backward after the 
accident has happened. In other words, he was not 
under a duty to foresee what he might at this time 
be able to see by looking back after the accident, 
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nor was he required to use extraordinary caution 
for the avoidance of an accident which he could not 
have expected under the circumstances." 
"You are further instructed that defendants 
driver Arthur Allen had a right to assume, unless 
put on notice to the contrary, that the operator of 
any automobile approaching from the opposite 
direction, in this instance Thomas Mecham, would 
approach in such a manner as to keep his automobile 
under control, approach at a reasonable and prudent 
speed having due regard to the surface of the high-
way, curve and other conditions, and that such ap-
proaching automobile would not carelessly or negli-
gently be permitted to get out of control or across 
the center of the highway." 
Instruction No. 5, R. 459: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the 
deceased Thomas Mecham upon approaching de-
fendants truck to remain upon his right or proper 
side of the highway and to keep his car under control 
to avoid turning or otherwise negligently colliding 
with defendants' truck and semi-trailer; that is to 
say, it was his duty to remain on the right side of 
the highway until both vehicles had completely 
passed each other. 
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence that 
the deceased, Thomas Mecham, at the time of and 
immediately before said collision, drove his vehicle 
across the center line of said highway and into 
the defendants lane of traffic, then the said Thomas 
Mecham was negligent." 
Instruction No. 7, R. 460: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the 
deceased Thomas Mecham to observe approaching 
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vehicles lawfully upon the highway and the exist-
ing condition, such as any hazard or curve in the 
road, at the scene of the accident and to remain 
in the lane of traffic designed for the use of east-
bound vehicles. It is no legal excuse for the driver 
of an automobile to fail to look, or to observe the 
existing conditions, when by reasonable care such 
could have been seen, and if you find from the 
evidence that Thomas Mecham either negligently 
failed to look or negligently failed to see existing 
conditions, including the approach of defendants 
truck, when he should have done so in the exercise 
of reasonable care, and that such negligence, if any, 
proximately contributed in any degree to cause the 
collision, then plaintiff is chargeable with that negli-
gence as I have heretofore indicated by these in-
structions." 
Instruction No. 9, R. 461, 462: 
"You are instructed that at the time of the 
collision between the Chevrolet automobile driven 
by Thomas Mecham and the truck driven by Arthur 
Allen, there were four persons in the front seat 
of the Mecham automobile. If you find from the 
evidence that such conditions crowded the driver 
of the Chevrolet, obstructed his view, or impaired 
his ability to operate the vehicle with due regard 
to the type of highway and conditions of traffic, 
and that such crowding, obstruction or impairment 
proximately contributed in any way to the collision, 
then Thomas Mecham was negligent." 
It would be unreasonable to conclude that the jury 
could find anything left in Instruction No. 11 upon which 
to consider relative issues of negligence as pertaining to 
both plaintiff and defendant. The instructions above 
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quoted specifically cover the very essence of defendants 
defense and argument of contributory negligence, to the 
effect that the decedent Thomas Mecham crossed the 
center line of the highway violating the law therein and 
in such was negligence. The court's instruction speci-
fically states that if the jury finds such to be true that 
the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on any of their 
counts. 
Mr. Justice Wade in the recent case of TUTTLE 
V. PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS COM-
PANY,--Utah--, 242 P. 2d 764, 770, states: 
"Here the jury could reasonably find from the 
evidence that decedent was driving his car from the 
south and turned his car suddenly and without 
warning into the course of the tractor-trailer when 
it was too late to avoid an accident and in so doing 
he did not use reasonable care for his own safety. 
So the presumption was thereby destroyed and in-
structing the jury thereon could only confuse rather 
than enlighten them, but this was not prejudicial. 
The court merely instructed that there was a pre-
sumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary 
and that question should not give the jury trouble 
although it was a question for the court and not 
the jury to decide. The jury was properly instructed 
that the defendant had the burden of persuading 
them that decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, which is greater burden than that which the 
presumption would place on them had it not been 
destroyed, so this presumption was not prejudicial 
for as Mr. Justice Lummus of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts once said, it would be like 
a 'handkerchief thrown over something also covered 
by a blanket.' " 
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Mr. Justice Lummus, in the case of Brown v. Hender-
son, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189 NE 4143, aptly summed up 
the situation as we have in this case when he stated: 
"When the statute casts upon the defendant 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, it did everything for the plaintiff that a 
presumption of his due care could do, and accord-
ing to most authorities on the subject of presump-
tions it did more. The statutory presumption of 
due care, therefore, is wholly overshadowed by that 
burden of proof, and can have no practical effect. 
If it never had been created, or should be abolished, 
neither party would be a whit better or the worse. 
The statutory presumption of due care is like a 
handk~rchief thrown over something covered by a 
blanket. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 563'; Board 
of Water Commissioners of City of New London 
v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 640, 74 Atl. 938. For this 
reason, if the burden of proof is correctly stated to 
the jury, there can be no reversible error in dealing 
with the presumption of due care, whether the 
judge adopts what seems the better course of refus-
ing to mention it at all, or, as the judge did in this 
case, indulges in what must needs be an academic 
discussion of its theoretical operation; and this, no 
matter whether that discussion conforms to the true 
theory of presumptions or not, since the simple 
ground that has been stated requires the overruling 
of these exceptions, and we- are dealing with a so-
called presumption which has no operative effect and 
only a verbal or theoretical existence, a discussion 
of the working of genuine presumptions would be 
superfluous." 
As was stated by Professor Edward M. Morgan 
in "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions" 44 
Harvard Law Review, 906 at page 908: 
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"If one could imagine a jury man critically 
examining such a charge, consciously analyzing his 
own mental processes and then attempting to make 
an accurate application of the charge to the case in 
hand, one might well say that nothing but confu-
sion would result, the belief, however, that the jury 
in the usual trial really understands and seriously 
endeavors to apply the details of the judge's instruc-
tions can hardly outlive a few years of experience 
on the trial bench or at the trial bar. The net effect 
of most of these rulings, it is ventured, is to throw 
to the jury many issues which might otherwise be 
determined by the judge, whether this end justifies 
the means depends largely upon one's views of the 
value and function of the jury." 
See also: "Instructing the Jury upon P.r.esumptions 
and Burden of Proof" 4 7 Harvard Law Review 59: 
"Behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit. 
That which is crooked cannot be made straight. 
These words of the ancient realist might well furnish 
the text for any discourse upon charges to the jury 
in the vast majority of American courts. No extend-
ed experience at the bar or upon the trial bench 
is required to produce a vivid realization that only 
in the exceptional case is the jury decisively in-
fluenced by the judge's instructions and in still rarer 
instances is its determination based upon the alloca-
tion of the burden of persuasion." 
Whatever argument appellants may set forth in 
their brief, it is apparent that the giving of Instruction 
No. 11 by the trial judge could in no way constitute pre-
judicial error in this case. Defendants argument in 
this regard was presented to the trial court in its motion 
for a new trial and the trial judge upon listening to the 
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argument of counsel denied their motion for a new 
trial upon this ground. R. 92. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellants at page 30 of their brief state: "It is 
submitted that defendants were the unwitting victims of 
a carefully prepared and executed surprise." There is 
no evidence whatsoever to substantiate Appellants con-
tention as will be pointed out in this argument. 
Appellants again at page 30 state: "Thereupon 
plaintiff presented as a purported rebuttal witness, one 
Alfred M. Carter." Mr. Carter was presented on rebuttal 
by plaintiffs and there was no objection taken to his 
testifying as a rebuttal witness and the court granted 
plaintiffs the right to examine him as such. R. 422. 
Appellants state at page 31 of their brief, "By a 
curious coincidence, he (Carter) did not see or talk 
to anyone about the accident until a year and one-half 
later when on the Saturday night after the plaintiff 
had rested he was visited by Mr. L. S. McCullough, one 
of the attorneys for plaintiff. R. 425-426." Of course, this 
statement of appellants is not correct. Mr. Carter's testi-
mony in this respect is as follows: (R. 425) 
"Q. Mr. Carter, when was your first talk with 




"Q. Was that the first time you had talked 
to anyone, any of the attorneys involved in the 
action? 
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A. It was Saturday. 
Q. This last Saturday? 
A. Saturday, yes." 
It is apparent by reading the record that Mr. Carter 
never meant that he had not talked to anyone concern-
ing the accident, but that the first time he talked with 
counsel for plaintiff was on Saturday during the trial. 
Counsel for appellant would be aware of this if they 
had read the record, for at page 439 on their cross-
examination of Mr. Carter they state: 
"Q. Did you discuss the accident with anybody? 
"A. With my wife and folks when I came back. 
Q. Did you discuss the accident with anybody 
at the scene? 
A. "No." 
Again at page 31 of their brief appellants state, "Yet 
all during the intervening period between the accident 
and the time of Mr. McCullough's visit he had been work-
ing in close association with one Simmons, father of 
plaintiff, in a group of construction employees at the 
Geneva Steel Plant. R. 81." Appellants cite "R. 81" 
the affidavit of Mr. B. F. Romano, a private detective 
who was employed by defendants to investigate Mr. 
Carter, to support their statement. However, his affidavit 
does not support their statement in this particular-Mr. 
Romano states, R. 81: 
"B. F. Romano being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: That he is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and over the age of twenty-one years; 
that he was employed by the defendants in the 
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above entitled action to investigate one Alfred M. 
Carter of Orem, Utah, and the testimony of said 
Carter in the trial of the above entitled case; that as 
part of his investigation he interviewed fellow em-
ployees of Carter at the Utah Construction Company 
at the Geneva Steel Plant; that one of said fellow 
employees of said Carter is the father of the plaintiff 
above named, one Mr. Simmons, and that some of 
the fellow employees of said Carter, knew or had 
heard that plaintiff Flora Mecham, the daughter of 
said Simmons, was involved in a lawsuit arising 
out of the death of her husband in an automobile 
accident in Provo Canyon." 
It is . apparent that appellants statement, that Mr. 
Simmons was, "during the intervening period," working 
in close association with Mr. Carter, is fallacious. Mr. 
Carter identified to the best of his knowledge his fellow 
employees at the time of the accident and Mr. Simmons 
was not one of them. R. 432. 
Appellants state at page 31 of their brief, "De-
fendant J. H. Allen came into the case in June, 1951, 
when the insurance company withdrew and the amended 
complaint was filed. His counsel were handicapped by 
a year's delay in investigation, * * * ." Of course, counsel 
only had from June until January, 1952, in which to pre-
pare their case, just a little over six months. The time 
hardly seems adequate. 
Again at page 31 of their brief appellants state, 
"Interrogatories were served on plaintiff asking the 
names of the witnesses (R. 11-12). Plaintiff replies with 
a weasling answer naming some, but expressly exclud-
ing those known to her attorneys, her father-in-law or 
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her brother-in-law. R. 13. Defendants were the~ forced 
to secure a court order directing plaintiff to furnish those 
names she had excluded. R. 21." Appellants contention 
appears to be that respondent exercised bad faith in 
answering the interrogatories, however, such is not the 
case. Defendants in their interrogatories at R. 11 re-
quested that the plaintiffs give them the names of any 
witnesses to the accident "within the knowledge of plain-
tiff or their representatives." Plaintiffs, not wishing to 
be caught in defendant's trap, under the guise of "rep-
resentatives" made their answers to the interrogatories 
and stated, "I am not aware of what information my 
father-in-law or brother-in-law or my attorneys have 
gathered since the date of this accident." R. 13. The 
court should be aware that plaintiff's attorneys reside 
in Salt Lake City. That the plaintiff, Flora Mecham, 
was residing in Midway, Utah. That her father-in-law 
was living in Wallsburg and the brother-in-law was 
living in Heber. Defendant put in a motion requesting 
that the plaintiff gives the names of all witnesses with-
in the knowledge of "plaintiffs attorneys, father-in-law 
and brother-in-law." R. 16. The court upon hearing 
defendants motion ordered that the attorneys for plain-
tiffs give any information they may have regarding wit-
nesses. However, they expressly excluded from the 
order the brother-in-law and father-in-law, and did not 
require that a trip be made from Salt Lake or from 
Midway to contact the brother-in-law in Heber or the 
father-in-law at Wallsburg as had been requested by 
defendants. R. 21. 
Appellants again state at page 31 of their brief, 
"The supplemental answer (R.22) named Er-
canbrack and White, two of plaintiff's principal wit-
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nesses at the trial of the action, as the eye witness, 
but did not mention Carter." 
Carter was not even known at that time by the plain-
tiffs or their counsel and, furthermore, Mr. Carter was 
not an eye witness to the accident as his testimony ex-
pressly shows. Mr. Carter testified that he heard the 
accident but he never testified that he was an eye wit-
ness to the accident. R. 424. Appellants at page 32 of 
their brief quote a portion of the deposition of W. 0. 
Mecham. In order that a complete understanding may 
be made of Mr. Mecham's testimony, I quote here a 
slightly larger portion of his deposition. At page 67, 
line 22 of the deposition: 
"Q. All right, who is William White? 
A. He's a fellow from-! don't know whether 
that would be the Steel Plant, called the Steel Plant, 
or would be on the Springville road. He works in 
Provo. 
Q. I see. And did he see the accident? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. And where was he? 
A. Well, he was going up the canyon. He was 
either in front of Ercanbrack or behind him. I 
couldn't say." 
Appellants in some rather startling deductions state 
at page 32 of their brief: 
"Now, William White did live on the Springville 
road, R. 190, and Mr. Carter did work at the Steel 
Plant, thus, it is apparent that W. 0. Mecham knew 
of an eye witness who worked at the Steel Plant, and 
plaintiffs father must have known." 
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Appellants reasoning in this regard is beyond com-
prehension. A simple reading of the record (R. 190) of 
Mr. White's testimony sufficiently conveys the meaning 
which Mr. Mecham had in mind, 
"Q. And where did you live when you talked 
to Mr. Colton? 
A. If I remember right, on the Springville Road. 
Q. Down by that yard where these wrecked 
cars are; is that where you were living at that time? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And that is just south of the County Old 
Folk's Home? 
A. That's right sir. 
Q. Near Ironton there? 
A. Yes sir." 
Appellants have forgotten that a Steel Plant is also 
located at Ironton on the Springville road and that Mr. 
White lived on the Springville road near an old wreck-
ing yard. Furthermore, as has been stated previously, 
Mr. Carter was not an eye witness to the accident. 
Appellants state at page 32 of their brief, "Any 
person who had been a witness to an accident 
where a man was killed and others were seriously 
injured, would be likely to discuss the matter with 
his fellow employees. It is stretching incredulity 
that plaintiff's father, Simmons, did not hear of Mr. 
Carter's connection with the accident if, in fact, he 
had been there." 
Appellant's statement is false speculation. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate when Mr. Simmons 
commenced working as a fellow employee of Carter, 
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and certainly this Court cannot speculate on the length 
of time Mr. Carter may have been inclined to discuss 
this accident with anyone, including fellow employees. 
Appellants at page 22 of their brief cite the cases of 
Delmas v. Martin and Whitfield v. Delericant, Cali-
fornia cases. Appellants rely upon these cases for the 
proposition that they were not aware of the circum-
stances or state of facts to which the witness Carter 
testified. Mr. Ercanbrack testified that at the time the 
Chevrolet automobile and the tractor-trailer came to 
rest immediately after the impact that the Chevrolet 
automobile was underneath the back end of the trailer 
and the trailer was upon the Mecham side of the high-
way. Appellants Arthur Allen and their witness Dale 
Mousley testified that the tractor and trailer and Chev-
rolet automobile immediately after the impact were 
separated by some 50 or 60 feet. Mr. Carter's testi-
mony was submitted on rebuttal to rebut the testimony 
of Mr. Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley and to cor-
roborate the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack. Certainly 
appellants cannot claim that they were unaware of the 
state of facts to which Mr. Ercanbrack would testify. 
By their own brief (page 32) they admit the taking of 
Mr. Ercanbrack's deposition, and his deposition as well 
as his testimony at the trial of the case are the same in 
regards to the location of the tractor-trailer and the 
Chevrolet automobile immediately after the impact. 
Appellants at page 33 of their brief under sub 
argument B, "Newly Discovered Evidence," state: "Un-
. til Carter testified, there was no credible evidence plac-
ing the car or truck in any other place than the photo-
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graphs and the investigating officers placed them. Car-
ter's testimony, if believed, raised a new issue of fact." 
Mr. Ercanbrack testified for respondents as herein-
above stated as to the location of the tractor-trailer and 
the Chevrolet automobile immediately after the impact. 
Mr. Carter's testimony was merely corroborating the tes-
timony of Mr. Ercanbrack for Mr. Carter placed the 
Chevrolet automobile under the back end of the trailer 
up against the back wheels in the same way that Mr. 
Ercanbrack had explained it. See R. 258, 427, 428. Ap-
pellants statement that Carter's testimony raised a new 
issus of fact is wrong. Appellants were aware of Mr. Er-
canbrack's testimony long prior to the trial therefore 
how could they claim surprise when Mr. Carter testifies 
to substantially the same thing. 
Appellants submitted as part of their motion for 
new trial, affidavits of Louis Washburn, Bert Nichols and 
Keith Taggert and appellants state at page 34 of their 
brief, 
"All of these proposed witnesses would testify 
that the vehicles immediately after the accident were 
at the places shown in the photographs and as testi-
fied by the investigating officers and not as testi-
fied by Carter." 
Respondents admit that these witnesses could testify 
that at the time they arrived at the scene of the acci-
dent the vehicles were in the position as shown by the 
investigating officers. However, it is shown by the 
testimony that the investigating officers did not arrive at 
the scene of the accident for some 20 minutes or more 
after the impact and that the injured people were al-
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ready loaded in the ambulance when they arrived. It 
should be noted that Burt Nichols, Louis Washburn, 
Allen Smith and James Thompson were traveling up 
Provo Canyon at the time of the accident; that they 
were passed by the Highway Patrol as they were going 
up the canyon, therefore, they could not have arrived 
as soon as the Highway Patrol did which was only after 
the ambulance had completed loading the injured peo-
ple. R. 84, 87. They also stated in their affidavits that 
they parked some 12 to 15 cars down canyon from the 
scene of the accident, indicating there were quite a num-
ber of cars ahead of them. R. 84, 87. Hence, if these 
affiants did not arrive at the scene of the accident until 
after the investigating officers arrived, they could not 
have been there at the time Mr. Carter was there. How-
ever, appellants state at page 34 of their brief, "It is 
submitted that their testimony, if believed would com-
pletely discredit the testimony of Carter and would fur-
nish evidence on the point not in issue in the case in 
chief." The testimony of Mr. Carter coincides with the 
testimony of the eye witness, Mr. Ercanbrack. (R. 258, 
427, 428) There is no new evidence that these affiants 
could inject into the case as their testimony coincides 
with the testimony submitted by appellant Arthur Al-
len, the driver of the tractor-trailer, and Dale Mousley 
who was a apssenger with Mr. Allen. (R 361, 362, 363, 
389, 390) Their testimony was submitted to the jury and 
the jury chose not to believe it. Appellants admit the 
principles of law as set forth in Klopenstine v. Hayes and 
Trimble v. Union Pacific which they cite at page 35 
of their brief, however, they state at page 35, 
"This principle defendants do not deny. But it is 
submitted, this case is quite a different situation. 
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The proposed evidence is to shed new light on an is-
sue which was not raised until Carter testified on 
rebuttal at the close of the trial." 
Again appellants talk about "light on a new issue" that 
was never raised until Mr. Carter testified. This is 
unbelievable in view of the record of Mr. Ercanbrack's 
testimony in which he testified as to the position of the 
tractor-trailor and the Chevrolet automobile immediate-
ly after they came to rest. Mr. Carter's testimony is 
only corroborating the testimony of Mr. Ercanbrack 
and rebutting the testimony of Mr. Arthur Allen, the 
driver. 
Appellants state at pages 35 and 36, " * * * but from 
all the plaintiffs witnesses that defendants were able to 
discover and interview or subject to examination by de-
position there was no issue as to the locale of the accident 
or the vehicles immediately thereafter." How appellants 
can make such a perverted statement is beyond reason. 
Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony is clear and· concise on this 
point. Mr. Ercanbrack's testimony as to the location of 
the vehicles and their position is set forth amply in plain-
tiff's statement of fact, however, perhaps a few quota-
tions from the record would be propitious at this point. 
At R. 256:-
"Q. Now, Mr. Ercanbrack, I show you what has 
been introduced in evidence as plaintiffs Exhibit C, 
which purports to be a view of the highway ap-
proaching the curve. Do you recognize that picture 
or that view? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have seen that picture before, I take 
it? 
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A. I don't know whether I have seen it before 
or not. Maybe they showed it to me in this depo-
sition they took. 
Q. Well, would that be a correct view, or a 
fair or correct view of the area of the highway 
approaching the place where the accident occurred? 
A. I believe it would. It's up in there quite 
aways where it occurred, as I recollect, by the two 
trees and the stump. 
Q. And I show you plaintiff's exhibit B and I 
will ask you if that is also a correct view or fair rep-
resentation of the view of the highway where the 
accident occurred aproaching and going up-canyon? 
A. It is. 
R. 257. 
"Q. Now, Mr. Ercanbrack, I show you Exhibit 
B. Do you recognize the automobile appearing in 
that photograph? That is if you were looking up the 
canyon? The camera was held down-canyon from 
that automobile. 
A. I do not. That picture was not taken while 
I was there. 
Q. Do you see anything similar to the car in that 
picture. and the Mecham automobile as you saw it 
at the time of the accident? 
A. Oh, yes, there is a few-it was broke up in a 
way but it wasn't in th~t position. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
this car shown in Exhibit D is the Mecham auto-
mobile? 
A. I do. 
R. 258 
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"Q. And does this photograph, Exhibit D, show 
the position of the Mecham automobile when you 
observed it at the scene? 
A. No. sir. 
Q. In what way doesn't it. 
A. Because the hind end is around there too 
much. It should be more like that. It should be con-
nected up with this trailer here. 
Q. You say that the trailer here should be con-
nected up with the car that appears in the picture? 
A. Pretty close to the radiator of this car so 
you could see it. This car should be around like this. 
It hit in that kind of a position and it was a little bit 
too far for me to pass." 
The testimony of Louis Washburn, Bert Nichols, 
James Thompson and Allen Smith is purely cumulative 
testimony of witnesses which the defendants Allen knew 
existed prior to the trial. Allen Smith, a cousin of Ar-
thur Allen and a nephew of J. H. Allen, was at the scene 
of the accident with Burt Nichols. Bert Nichols stated 
in his sworn statement that he saw Arthur Allen at the 
scene of the accident; that he had talked with Dale 
Mousley, a brother-in-law of Arthur Allen subsequent 
to the day of the accident while doing work for Dale 
Mousley and that he knew about the trial of the case 
when it was first set for going to trial. R. 84. Louis 
Washburn stated he and Burt Nichols and Allen Smith 
walked up to the scene of the accident and talked with 
Arthur Allen and Dale Mousley; that he has known 
Arthur Allen for at least 10 years; that Dale Mousley 
talked with Louis Washburn prior to the trial and Dale 
Mousley knew at that time that Burt Nichols and Allen 
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Smith were at the scene of the wreck at the time it 
occurred; that they were at the scene of the accident 
and talked to him. R. 87. Respondents were unable to 
secure the affidavits of Allen Smith, Burdett Jensen and 
Keith Taggart, however, they talked with all three. 
Their antagonism however made it impossible for re-
spondents to secure an affidavit from them but Allen 
Smith stated that he saw Burdett Jensen, brother-in-
law of Keith Taggart, at the scene of the accident. That 
Allen Smith the cousin of Arthur Allen and nephew of 
J. H. Allen, subsequent to the accident, talked to Burdett 
Jensen in Draper, Utah; that Allen Smith was known 
by the defendants to be at the scene of the accident 
shortly after it occurred; that the defendents Allen have 
talked with said Allen Smith about the accident on sev-
eral occasions during the interval since the accident; that 
J. H. Allen was aware of the fact that Burdett Jensen 
and Keith Taggart were at the scene of the accident 
shortly thereafter and J. H. Allen prior to the trial came 
to the barn of the Jensen farm and talked to Burdett 
Jensen about the accident and about Burdett Jensen 
being at the accident. That J. H. Allen was again at 
the Jensen farm subsequent to the date of the trial. 
R. 91. It is apparent that the testimony of these affiants 
would be merely cumulative; that there are no new 
issues involved by reason of Carter's testimony; that 
respondents were perfectly aware prior to the trial of 
the testimony affiants would give and yet they never 
attempted to secure any of their testimony to be pre-
sented to the jury. The trial court upon hearing defend-
ants motion for a new trial and upon reading the 
affidavits which they had submitted denied defendants' 
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motion for a new trial. R. 92. As this court has stated 
in numerous cases, and more recently in Marshall v. 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. 221 P. 2d 868, 869: 
"The granting or· denying of a motion for a new 
trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
When a trial court grants a new trial we will not 
disturb its action unless it is manifestly appartent 
that the court has abused its discretion. It is also 
true as this court is well aware, that when a trial 
court has denied a motion for a new trial, that this 
court on appeal will not upset the lower court's order 
unless it is manifestly apparent that there has been 
an abuse of discretion. See also, Moser v. Z. C. M. I., 
197 P. 2d, King v. Union Pacific RR Co. 212 P. 2d 
692; also State v. Cooper, 201 P. 2d 764; see also 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P 2d 708; 
Klopenstine v. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, Trimble 
v. Union Pacific Stages, 105, Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674; 
see also State v. Moore, 41 Utah 247, 126 P. 322, An-
notated Cases 1915 C-976, also Greco v. Gentile, 
88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155." 
In Moser v. Z. C. M. I., 197 P. 2d 136 at page 139, 
the court states, 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit 
of any serious dispute (and appellants do not con-
tend otherwise) that the question of granting or de-
nying a motion for new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. Wade v. 
Union Pacific RR Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030; Van 
Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 
50; Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 
284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bow:q Livestock Co., 
74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 
Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies whether 
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evi-
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dence or upon newly discovered evidence. See cases 
above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. 55 
Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 
P. 2d 1155; Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 105 
Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674. This court cannot sub-
stitute its discretion for that of the trial court. 
James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068, 2 
NCCA 782. We do not ordinarily interfere in rul-
ings of the trial court in either granting or denying 
a motion for a new trial, and unless abuse of, or 
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of the trial 
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial 
judge will be sustained. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. 
Moyle at al, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867; Wade v. Union 
Pac. RR Co. (supra); Utah State Nat'l Bank v. 
Livingston, (supra); Clark v. Los Angeles & SLR 
Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; and Trimble v. Union 
Pacific Stages, (supra); see also Harrison v. Sutter 
Street Railway Co., 116 Cal 156, 161, 47 P. 1019, 
1020." 
The lower court considered that the counter affi-
davits filed by plaintiffs fully and satisfactorily explained 
matters set forth in the affidavits filed by defendants. 
Further quoting from the Moser case at page 142 P. 2d: 
"As was said in Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 
347, 57 P. 2d 708, 722: 'In a case such as this where 
the facts are to be proved by the observations of a 
number of witnesses, the verdict cannot be lightly 
set aside to permit more witnesses to testify, for new 
witnesses might continue to be discovered over a 
long period of time. 
"And again: 'It is only under very special cir-
cumstances because of the quality or type of propos·-
ed evidence and where it makes clear a fact. which 
was formerly in doubt that new trials are granted 
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to allow the defeated party to add cumulative evi-
dence newly discovered, and that only where there 
is a clear probability that the result of a new trial 
would be different.' 
"As to the conflict in the affidavits on the ques-
tion of whether or not plaintiff made certain state-
ments to the insurance agent, defendants contend 
that this should be resolved by a jury in a new 
trial. The ready answer to that contention is that 
it is well settled in this jurisdiction that where the 
newly discovered evidence is merely impeachment 
of an adverse witness, it is not sufficient to justify 
a new trial. Klopenstine v. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57 
P. 712; Trimble v. Union Pac. Stages, 105 Utah 457, 
142 P. 2d 674." 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCullough, Boyce and McCullough 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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